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9 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA Materials in the White House and in
Presidential Libraries

1. Here is a summary of a 90-minute conversation I had on 5 September with Mr. Arthur McCafferty, the staff officer of the National Security Council who is responsible for maintaining the vault which contains all material in the White House on foreign affairs, national security, and intelligence.
2. Everything in the vault is scheduled to be shipped to Austin for inclusion in the special classified section of the Johnson Library. This practice was followed in assembling the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Libraries. Even though CIA made no specific contributions to either the Truman or Eisenhower Library as such, Mr. McCafferty said "you would be absolutely astounded to know how much CIA material is in them. I think you can take it for granted that every goddam piece of paper ever sent to Mr. Eisenhower by CIA is in the Eisenhower Library. There are probably two full safes of material in the Kennedy Library devoted to the missile crisis, and this certainly includes material provided by CIA."
3. At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the assassination in 1963, the roadway outside the entrance to the West Wing was piled high with boxes from the vault to be shipped to the Kennedy Library. This will be true again on 19 January 1969. (And it raises the question whether CIA should try to obtain permission to inspect and catalogue the CIA materials already in the various presidential libraries. The White House filing system by which documents are filed according to general subject only, and not by origin, would make this an exceedingly large task.) The decision as to what papers in the foreign and security fields will be made available to the next administration is to be made by Walt Rostow and McCafferty implied that this is a matter of pressing unfinished business.
4. At the same time McCafferty emphasized that the Government's laws and regulations applying to the handling of classified material are binding on the Presidential Library and will continue to be until such material is specifically declassified, presumably by the originating Agency. In the case of the Kennedy Library, McCafferty pointed out that even the White House staff has difficulty in getting access to material, and that the archivist in charge of the Kennedy Library is himself unable to go into certain safes. (He implied CIA might

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have considerable difficulty in gaining access to the sensitive parts of the Kennedy collection.) Meanwhile the current practice is for most White House files to be kept in a central registry, except for those under the charge of Mr. McCafferty. The central registry includes only one type of material of concern to CIA, so far as Mr. McCafferty is aware. This is material on CIA's congressional liaison: for example, the monthly letter and a weekly synopsis of events relating to congressional liaison which CIA used to provide.

5. As for McCafferty's vault, which he showed me, it is a room about 8 x 15 feet which contains four banks of open shelves from the floor almost to the ceiling, all stuffed full, with boxes or other material on top. All this material has every type of classification through SI. Material of higher classification is kept in safes requiring special access and one safe is reserved for material considered extremely sensitive. The only material systematically broken down within a large subject is that dealing with Vietnam. The manner in which material on Vietnam is filed is illustrated by two documents he gave me and which are attached. These files contain, for example, all the assessment reports of the effects of bombing of North Vietnam which were prepared either by OER or by OER and DIA and sent to the White House. As McCafferty flipped through one file for me, the one on attitudes of the North Vietnamese leadership, I noticed papers produced by ONE and OCI, a number of CS reports from FE Division, and a memorandum signed by George Carver, along with other materials from DOD and State produced both here and abroad. It looked as if the files on Vietnam made up about one quarter of the total; McCafferty said that almost everything sent to the White House on Vietnam has been saved with the exception of picture boards and other products of photo reconnaissance.

6. McCafferty believes that only two of the continuing serial products of CIA are present in their entirety: the President's Daily Brief and the Special Daily Report on Vietnam. But the OCI situation reports on past crises are also present; McCafferty showed me two long shelves full of material on the Dominican Republic which he said included the sitreps.* The criterion for preserving these three types of material is that they have been personally seen by the President. This same criterion dictates preservation - and shipment to Austin - of all memoranda from CIA to the President - e.g. the DCI's of 27 March 1967 on the report of the Katzenbach Committee.

* Incidentally, I noticed one folder in the Dominican Republic file labeled with the name of a public opinion poll. Another, which serves to remind us that much of the most sensitive material did not come from the CIA, is labeled "BENNETT: 'HELP!' "

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7. Contrary to the impression given to the Office of Security, the file of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates is not complete: each estimate which has been superseded by a later one is usually destroyed. Other products of ONE are present only if they have been sent to the President personally or are on a subject of particular importance at the moment. I saw several which had buckslips from the DCI to the President.

8. The Current Intelligence Bulletin is generally kept for three months and then returned to CIA.

9. The preservation of White House copies of blue-stripe reports has been very selective. McCafferty estimates that 75% are destroyed and of the remainder only a very small number have been shown to the President. One he remembered, for example, dealt with the speech by Brezhnev on the world situation last Spring. Since the report was long it was necessary to provide a summary, and McCafferty obtained this from CIA. (Incidentally, when he selects such a report for the President to see, he usually asks OCI for a quick analysis of its significance.) We discussed the question of source data in these reports, since whether a given report will be shown to the President depends to a considerable degree on the reliability and importance of the source. Thus some of the blue-stripe reports contain highly sensitive information on the source in the accompanying summary. I told McCafferty that these summaries must therefore be among the most sensitive material in the White House, especially when they reveal or suggest a CIA penetration of a friendly foreign government or an unusual liaison relationship. I asked if it would be possible to identify which blue-stripe reports are still in the vault and then if it would be possible to retrieve those of unusual sensitivity for maintenance in CIA custody. McCafferty said he would be willing to check for the presence of individual reports if we provided the date of the report, the date of transmittal, the title, and the country or area. As for retrieving them, he said that any request would have to be made by the DCI to the President.

10. The practice of destroying outdated NIEs and returning outdated CIBs represents almost the only effort of the White House staff to purge the files of old material. McCafferty and his assistant emphasized that they have neither the manpower nor the time to apply any criterion of selectivity to documents in general once they have been put in the vault. The breakdown of Vietnam files into categories and sub-categories, only recently reorganized, is a much more systematic approach than it has been possible to apply to other materials in the vault. Thus what is preserved for posterity reflects to a considerable degree the pressure of workload and lack of opportunity to purge rather than a carefully conceived program of selection for historical purposes.

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11. The quantity of White House material from photo reconnaissance is negligible. McCafferty believes there are no picture boards, and said readout of overhead photography will be present only if it has been transmitted by the DCI or is included in a special report to the President. The quantity of this type of material is exceedingly limited.

12. Of FBIS material the reports on worldwide reactions to such events as the Glassboro meeting and the Russell "Tribunal" are in the White House, but propaganda analyses are not and neither are the daily reports of FBIS.

13. Material in the White House which came from the National Intelligence Surveys consists of a few sections on Vietnam, perhaps some on the Dominican Republic, and maybe half a dozen other isolated sections.

14. There is practically nothing in the White House from the Foreign Documents Division.

15. Special Briefings provided by CIA are in the White House only if they were provided in written form. Hearings of CIA before committees of Congress are included only if the DCI provided them personally to the President.

16. The following is the situation as McCafferty understands it with respect to material bearing on CIA activities from sources outside the Agency:

a. Papers produced by or for the 303 Committee are not in Walt Rostow's file, and in principle are not considered to be part of the White House collection. They have been returned to Peter Jessup's file after use, and thus even those which are still in the White House can be considered as in the present or eventual custody of CIA. This would be true of the Trueheart Report, for example.

b. Minutes and other documents of the U.S. Intelligence Board are not formally received by the White House. NSC Liaison may send them to Bromley Smith, "who reads them and throws them away". McCafferty can think of no USIB papers in his files.

c. There are no PFIAB papers in the White House files, and McCafferty doubts that any PFIAB papers will be provided to the Austin Library. (We must check this with General Taylor or Pat Coyne.) Special papers such as the reports of the Knox and Eaton Panels went from PFIAB to the White House but were returned to PFIAB.

d. National Security Action Memoranda are published by the White House and will go to Austin.

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e. McCafferty estimates that 98% of the papers produced by the Senior Interdepartmental Group are in the vault, but very few of those produced by the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. There is, of course, IRG material in the files of the individual staff officers in the White House who are members of an IRG. It is not certain whether their files will go to Austin, but the answer is probably yes.

f. It is also not certain whether the files of Dr. Hornig will go to Austin but again the answer is probably yes. This remains to be checked, along with the question of what materials from the DD/S&T may be provided the Library by him or other donors.

g. McCafferty thinks that the entire files of the Warren Commission are in the Kennedy Library, and that nothing affecting the Warren Commission is now in the White House except perhaps in those personal files of McGeorge Bundy which date from the Johnson Administration.

17. From all this it is clear that CIA has already made, willy nilly, a voluminous and important contribution to the Johnson Library. In the next few days I shall circulate some observations on what we can most usefully do to round it out. We ought also to be thinking of a systematic approach to this problem in the next and future administrations, since Presidential Libraries containing everything in the White House vault are clearly here to stay.



Coordinator,
Johnson Library Project

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Attachments: 2 Memos on Vietnam Files

Distribution:

DCI
Ex. Dir.-Compt.
DDP
DDI
DD/S&T
DDS
D/DCI/NIPE
OGC
OLC
D/ONE
D/Sec.
CA Staff
Historical Staff
(Others to be added)



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MISSING PAGE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Missing attachments:

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, Support Services Staff		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 150px; margin-bottom: 10px;"></div> <p>Concerning the Presidential Libraries Project, [redacted] visited the vault at the White House. He found many CIA documents that usually go with the departing President. His 5-page report was read by Mr. Helms who expressed his pleasure after reading it.</p> <p>Some 15 copies were distributed (including one to DDS). I have omitted copying the 10-page attachment which itemizes the arrangement and titles of folders in the "Viet Nam Files".</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
1: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
CIA Records Admin. Officer		17 Sep 68	
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, Support Services Staff		
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p>From this report on his visit there last week you will note was impressed with the security and controls National Archives exercises over Presidential Library files. He has speculated to me informally upon a few alternative propositions to which we will eventually have to respond, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Turning all of our OSS collection over to the Roosevelt Library. b. Sub-dividing our Archives collection (6,000 cubic feet) into chronological groups to be put into the related Presidential collections. <p style="text-align: right;">(OVER)</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
CIA Records Admin. Officer			17 Sep 68
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

- c. Constructing and operating our own Archives outside the Records Center.
- d. Destroying all of our old permanent records collections.